Dismissal for failure to pass the probationary period: the limitation periods provided for other cases of dismissal do not apply (Supreme Court, No. 9282/2025)
A worker challenged his dismissal for failure to complete the probationary period intimated to him by his employer.
The application was rejected by the competent Court of Appeal on the grounds that it was time-barred pursuant to Article 6 of Law no. 604/1966, since the employee – despite having promptly challenged the dismissal out of court and, at the same time, requested an attempt at conciliation – had not, following the employer’s refusal of the attempt at conciliation, lodged a judicial appeal within the 60-day time limit provided for by the law.
The judges of legitimacy, overturning the ruling of second instance, clarified that the scope of application of the statute of limitations set out in Article 6 of Law No. 604/1966 is limited to the cases expressly listed in Article 32 of Law No. 183/2010, which does not include dismissal for failure to pass the probationary period except “from the time when the employment becomes definitive and, in any event, when six months have elapsed since the beginning of the employment relationship”.
And in fact, the function of dismissal for failure to pass the probationary period is linked to the possibility for employer and employee to assess the mutual convenience of the employment relationship, which is why the rules governing dismissal must be considered different from those provided for ordinary dismissals.
In this hypothesis, therefore, the limitation periods set out in Article 6 of Law No. 604/1966 cannot be considered applicable, the ordinary five-year limitation period having to be applied instead.
Union conciliation is not valid if it is not provided for in the NCBA (Supreme Court, No. 10065/2025)
An employee took legal action against the employer requesting a declaration of the nullity of the union conciliation by which the reduction of remuneration had been agreed upon and, consequently, requesting the payment of salary differences.
The Court of Appeal, upholding this request, declared the nullity of the conciliation, since, although in the presence of the union representative, it had been signed at the company’s premises.
The Supreme Court, in accordance with the ruling of the court of second instance, noted that the validity of the conciliation is given not only by the effective assistance of the trade union, but also by the place where the signing of the settlement agreement takes place, both elements necessary to ensure the free determination of the employee with respect to the waivers made as well as the absence of any conditioning.
The presence of the union representative, therefore, alone is not sufficient to guarantee the existence of these conditions, with the result that the settlement agreement must, correctly, be considered null and void.
In light of the foregoing, in the event of the signing of a settlement agreement between the company and the employee, it is necessary that the union assistance be effective and that the signing take place at the union’s premises.
Dismissal for failure to complete probationary period: invalid in case of assignment to different tasks (Court of Messina, No. 591/2025)
An employee challenged her dismissal for failure to complete the probationary period imposed on her, claiming that she had not been assigned to the duties of delicatessen worker provided for in her employment contract, but rather to those of cashier.
The court of first instance, at the end of the preliminary investigation stage, ruled that in the present case a negative outcome of the trial could not be declared, since the manner in which the trial period had been carried out did not appear to be suitable for ascertaining the employee’s ability to work.
Not only that, in determining the consequences in this case, the Court was able to distinguish between genetic defects and functional defects of the probationary period.
The first take the form of the absence of one of the fundamental requisites of the probationary period such as, for example, the written form, and determine the nullity of the probationary period with the consequence that the probationary agreement is as if it had never been signed and the dismissal is subject to the ordinary discipline of individual dismissals.
The second, on the other hand, while not invalidating the clause relating to the probationary period, relates to the improper fulfilment of the provisions of the probationary agreement itself, as occurred in the present case where the employee was assigned to duties other than those provided for in the employment contract.
In the latter case, the consequence is the employee’s right to continue the probationary period, where possible, or to receive compensation for the prejudice suffered. Therefore, it is essential that a sufficiently detailed job description be attached to the contract of employment and that the probationary period relate solely and exclusively to the tasks specified therein.
Apprenticeship contract void in the absence of training (Supreme Court, No. 6990/2025)
An employee challenged the apprenticeship contract signed with her employer, claiming that the training provided for therein had not been carried out.
The courts of legitimacy had occasion to clarify that the apprenticeship contract is a mixed-cause contract, the peculiarity of which lies in the fact that the employee provides his work against the employer’s obligation to pay him the salary, as well as to provide him with the training useful for acquiring the qualification for which he was hired.
It follows from the above that, the lack of training entails the nullity of the apprenticeship contract for lack of cause, with the consequent transformation into an open-ended contract as from the commencement of the employment relationship, with all the consequences of law and contract.
It is not possible to pay the accrual of severance pay (TFR) monthly in the pay slip (Labour Inspectorate, Circular No. 616 of April 3, 2025)
In its Circular No. 616 of April 3, 2025, the Labour Inspectorate examined the debated issue concerning the possibility of advancing the amount accrued as TFR in employees’ monthly pay slip.
In particular, the Labour Inspectorate clarified that, outside the possibilities of advance payment of the TFR provided for by Article 2120 of the Italian Civil Code, the TFR must be paid to the employee only at the time of termination of employment.
This is because the TFR represents a sum accumulated monthly by the employer, on behalf of the employee, with the purpose of guaranteeing the latter economic support at the end of the employment relationship.
Moreover, the collective or individual agreement, which provides for more favourable conditions for the advance payment of the TFR, cannot consist in a mere automatic transfer of the amount accrued monthly for this purpose by the employee in his pay packet.
