On 9 November 2026, the OECD held a public consultation in Paris on the revision of Chapter VII of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines, dedicated to intercompany services.
The discussion involved companies, associations and professionals. The seven sessions focused on the benefit test, the boundary with intangibles, remuneration criteria, allocation keys and documentation requirements.
The proposed changes are not yet final. The document published on 1 June 2026 contains proposals on which the OECD will continue its work.
However, the consultation brought a decisive issue to the fore: greater clarity of the rules must not result in new automatisms or disproportionate documentation requests.
The benefit test: existence of the service and arm’s length nature of the price
Paragraphs 7.13-7.20 of the draft distinguish two levels of analysis. The first concerns the existence of the service and the benefit expected by the recipient company. The second concerns the appropriateness of the consideration charged.
The benefit must be reasonably foreseeable at the time the service is rendered. It does not necessarily have to translate into a positive economic result.
Consequently, losses incurred by the recipient company do not, in themselves, demonstrate that the service was not provided. An independent enterprise may also purchase consulting or support activities without achieving the result initially expected.
The ex post economic result therefore cannot become a retroactive criterion for denying the existence of the service.
The review of the price remains a separate matter. Even where a service has actually been provided, it must be determined whether the consideration is consistent with what independent parties would have agreed in comparable circumstances.
The revision therefore reinforces a fundamental distinction: proving the benefit is not the same as demonstrating that the price complies with the arm’s length principle.
The boundary between services and intangibles
A second issue concerns the distinction between intercompany services and the transfer of intangibles.
Paragraph 7.41 examines the case of strategic consulting provided by the parent company using proprietary methodologies. In certain circumstances, the activity might also entail a transfer of know-how.
During the consultation, however, any possible automatism was challenged. The use of specialised knowledge or the delivery of a result does not necessarily entail the transfer of rights over an intangible.
It must be verified which rights have actually been granted. Can the recipient use the methodology independently? Can it reproduce, modify or transfer it? Or does it merely receive the output of the activity performed by the service provider?
A service that uses valuable technology or know-how does not automatically give rise to a royalty. However, nor does it necessarily have to be remunerated with a routine mark-up.
Characterisation and remuneration remain separate analyses. The former identifies what has actually been transferred. The latter determines the appropriate price based on the economic characteristics of the transaction.
Remuneration method
The draft rules out an automatic preference for cost-based methods.
Paragraph 7.52 requires consideration of the functions performed, the assets used, the risks assumed and the value generated. A cost-based method may be appropriate for standardised activities. It may not be, however, where the service uses valuable intangibles or produces results that are not reflected in the cost base.
The profit split method also requires specific justification. The complexity of the service is not sufficient. Elements such as a high degree of integration, unique and valuable contributions, or the sharing of economically significant risks must be present.
Allocation keys
Paragraph 7.48 requires that they reflect the use of the service and the expected benefit, while remaining verifiable and manageable.
The choice depends on the nature of the service:
- the number of tickets may be reasonable for a helpdesk;
- headcount may be consistent for certain HR services;
- the number of users or devices may work for certain IT services.
These criteria are not, however, universally valid. For cybersecurity, for example, the number of interventions may not reflect the value of continuous protection.
The true-up between budgeted and actual costs also requires attention. Adjusting the cost pool does not automatically clarify who should bear unforeseen cost increases or inefficiencies. The answer depends on which party would have assumed such risks under arm’s length conditions.
Documentation requirements
The most sensitive aspect remains documentation.
Paragraph 7.71 clarifies that the guidance in the draft does not represent a mandatory minimum checklist. The burden must be proportionate to the materiality and complexity of the transactions.
The subsequent paragraphs nevertheless refer to numerous items of evidence: expected benefits, correspondence, deliverables, operational reports, cost bases and the calculation of allocation keys.
The risk is that such examples become systematic requests during tax audits. Not all ongoing services produce individualised documents. For activities such as cybersecurity, IT infrastructure or financial coordination, the evidence may also derive from business processes, service levels, periodic reports and representative samples.
The quality of evidence does not depend on the quantity of documents, but on their ability to link activities, benefits and consideration.
Conclusion
The consultation of 9 November confirmed that the revision of Chapter VII may have a profound impact on the management of intercompany services.
For multinational enterprises, it will be essential to build a coherent path demonstrating:
- why the service was requested;
- what benefit was reasonably expected;
- how the activity was actually performed;
- why the consideration complies with the arm’s length principle.
In this path, an intercompany agreement defined in a timely manner and, preferably, before the services begin takes on particular importance. The contract should clearly identify the nature and recipients of the services, the responsibilities of the parties, the criteria for determining the consideration, the composition of the cost pool, any mark-up, the allocation keys and the true-up mechanism.
Having a certain date (data certa) prior to the performance of the services can strengthen the defensibility of the contractual framework, evidencing that conditions and remuneration criteria were established ex ante and not reconstructed at the time of an audit.
It does not, however, constitute sufficient proof that the services were actually rendered: the contract must be borne out by the conduct of the parties and by operational evidence proportionate to the nature of the activities, such as correspondence, service levels, business systems, periodic reports and representative samples.
The challenge will be to reconcile clarity of the rules, sustainability of the evidence and defensibility of the charges, ensuring a verifiable link between the contractual arrangement, the activities actually performed, the expected benefits and the remuneration criteria.
A more detailed Chapter VII will be truly useful only if it avoids de facto checklists and automatic presumptions, instead emphasising the proportionality of documentation and the quality of the evidence.